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1We introduce a model of a local public goods economy with a con-
tinuum of agents and jurisdictions with ¯nite, but unbounded pop-
ulations. Under boundedness of per capita payo®s we demonstrate
nonemptiness of the core of the economy. We then demonstrate that
the equal treatment core coincides with the set of price-taking equi-
librium outcomes with anonymous prices { that is, prices for public
goods depend only on observable characteristics of agents. Existence
of equilibrium follows from nonemptiness of the core and equivalence
of the core to the set of equilibrium outcomes. Our approach provides
a new technique for showing existence of equilibrium in economies
with a continuum of agents.
J.E.L. classi¯cation codes. C62, D71, H41
1 Introduction
In his seminal paper, Tiebout (1956) suggests that if public goods are subject
to congestion, the bene¯ts of sharing costs over a large number of agents
will eventually be o®set by the negative e®ects of crowding. Balancing the
e®ects of cost-sharing and congestion make it advantageous for agents to
be partitioned into a system of disjoint jurisdictions. Tiebout speculates
that these jurisdictions would o®er competing bundles of local public goods
levels and tax liabilities and that agents would move to jurisdictions whose
membership, public goods and taxes most closely approximate their ideal
combinations. Tiebout concludes that if public goods are local, agents will
reveal their preferences through their locational choice and the free rider
problem will disappear.
In e®ect, Tiebout hypothesizes that in a local public goods economy,
competitive forces will lead to e±cient equilibrium outcomes. Tiebout's pa-
per is quite informal, however, and while he makes a plausible case for the
preference revelation properties of equilibrium, he does not deal with the
question of existence. Subsequent more rigorous investigations have shown
that the nonexistence problem is far from trivial. One of the most famous of
these is the paper by Bewley (1981) which presents a series of examples to
show that competitive equilibrium may not exist and, when it does, may not
be e±cient. While many of Bewley's counterexamples are open to criticism
(in particular, Bewley ignores the essential role of small group e®ectiveness {
that almost all gains to collective activities can be realized by relatively small
2
Abstract.groups of agents), his basic point holds. It is possible to write down reason-
able examples of economies for which competitive equilibria do not exist.
Bewley's criticism goes to the very foundations of the Tiebout hypothesis. If
he is correct, then the relevance of the vast literature that Tiebout's paper
generated is in serious doubt. There is limited value in studying the prop-
erties of an equilibrium concept that seldom exists. Not surprisingly, the
question of existence has occupied the attention of many authors. We divide
their contributions into four branches and give a brief discussion below.
The ¯rst branch treats a model with a continuum of agents who divide
themselves into an exogenously ¯xed, ¯nite number of jurisdictions, each of
which subsequently chooses public goods levels according to a voting rule.
All these papers consider Nash equilibrium and di®er mainly in their treat-
ments of land and taxation rules. Papers using income taxes with major-
ity voting over public good levels include Westho® (1977), who considers a
model without land, and Dunz (1989), who adds indivisible land. Greenberg
and Shitovitz (1988) treat a related model in which land is divisible and
the d-majority voting rule developed in Greenberg (1979) is used to decide
within-jurisdiction allocations. Agents are immobile in this model, however,
and so are not allowed to move to their most preferred jurisdiction. Konishi
(1996) extends the model by allowing mobility of agents across jurisdictional
boundaries. All these papers show the existence of equilibrium.1 Income
taxes, however, have been criticized as unrealistic since the vast majority
of local public goods in the United States are funded by property taxes.
Rose-Ackerman (1979) shows that, unfortunately, when land is divisible and
property taxes are used to fund public good provision, consumers' preferences
may not be single-peaked and so majority voting equilibrium may not exist.
Epple, Filimom and Romer (1984, 1993) succeed in proving existence in a ver-
sion Rose-Ackerman's economy in which preferences satisfy a \single-crossing
property". In contrast, Nechyba (1996) shows existence of equilibrium in a
fairly general model with indivisible land and property taxes.
The literature noted above succeeds in addressing the very di±cult ques-
tion of the existence of equilibrium in a variety of interesting and realis-
tic institutional environments. There is one important respect, however, in
1A closely related literature uses a similar model but employs Foley's (1979) public
competitive equilibrium rather than voting to choose within-jurisdiction public goods lev-
els. This approach was initiated by Richter (1975) and Greenberg (1977) in models which
do not allow agents to migrate between jurisdictions. The migration restriction is relaxed
in Richter (1982) and Greenberg (1983).
3which it falls short of con¯rming Tiebout's hypothesis. While the equilibria
these authors describe can be shown to exist, they are not, in general, Pareto
e±cient. It is easy for agents to become trapped in suboptimal states for
which coalitional deviations would yield a signi¯cant Pareto improvement,
but which are stable against Nash's unilateral deviations. In many of these
models it may even be the case that none of the Nash equilibria are Pareto
optimal. This is because the institutions of taxation (especially) and voting
constrain agents' actions. For example, if equal sharing of costs is imposed,
poor agents may simply not be able a®ord to join coalitions with rich agents
who have high demands for public goods. Thus, even if crowding is not a
signi¯cant factor, agents will segregate by income in equilibrium. This is
despite the fact that they would all be better o® pooling their resources and
living in one large jurisdiction with unequal sharing of costs. At best, Nash
equilibria are Pareto optimal over all allocations which respect the institu-
tional constraint, but are not in the unconstrained core.2 We hasten to add
that this should be interpreted as a criticism of the soundness of Tiebout's
conjecture in real economic settings and not as a theoretical failing on the
part of the above mentioned authors. All of the papers in this literature also
share the feature that equilibrium involves an uncountable number of agents
being packed into a ¯nite set of jurisdictions. We discuss this in more detail
below.
A second branch of the literature addresses some of the issues discussed
above by considering the existence of the core in ¯nite economies. Obvi-
ously, the core is e±cient and only ¯nite numbers of agents will be in each
jurisdiction in a ¯nite economy. Guesnerie and Oddou (1981) explore such
a model using proportional income taxes. They show that if the population
has less than or equal to three agents, the core will exist. Weber and Za-
mir (1985) then show the complementary proposition: in general the core
will not exist if there are more than three agents. Subsequently, Green-
berg and Weber (1986) and separately Demange (1994) show that for any
¯nite-sized economy, the core will exist, but only under fairly severe restric-
tions on preferences. In a similar vein, Conley and Konishi (2002) treat a
very simple economy with one public good and identical agents with single
peaked preferences and show existence of asymptotically e±cient equilibria.
Their approach does not seem to be extendable to more complex economies,
2Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber (1998) provide an example that shows that it may
even be the case the no Nash equilibria satisfy constrained Pareto optimality.
4however. Thus, this literature comes to a largely negative conclusion on the
question of existence of equilibrium.
A third branch of the literature was initiated by Ellickson (1979), who
treats local public goods as indivisible commodities. Ellickson de¯nes a no-
tion of Nash equilibrium in which all agents who choose the same type of
indivisible commodities can be thought of as being in the same jurisdiction.
His model has a ¯nite number of agents and a ¯nite number of divisible pri-
vate commodities. In addition to showing that equilibrium exists, Ellickson
shows that it can be decentralized by a set of average cost prices. These
results, however depend on a strong assumption on the technology. Specif-
ically, Ellickson assumes that eventually the cost of providing any type of
(indivisible) public good is linear in the number of agents. Thus, jurisdic-
tions may be too small to exhaust returns to scale, but they can never be too
large. Put another way, congestion takes place in production, but for su±-
ciently large jurisdictions, there is neither per capita harm nor bene¯t from
adding agents to the jurisdictions. In this sense, his indivisible public goods
are closer in spirit to public services as described in Bewley (1981), for exam-
ple, than to nonrival public goods. Under weaker conditions, Vohra (1987)
treats a similar model and shows the existence of second best approximate
equilibrium. In a related paper, Vohra (1984) treats a continuum version of
this model. He shows the existence of a type of exact equilibrium in which
the continuum of agents choose over a ¯nite set of indivisible commodities
(in interpretation, jurisdictions.) He is able to relax some of the restrictive
assumptions of congestion imposed by Ellickson (1979) and Vohra (1984).
The main problem with these approaches is that while equilibria do exist,
a ¯rst welfare theorem does not hold. It may be possible to support many
quite ine±cient allocations in general.3
To summarize these ¯rst three literatures, except under the very special
conditions, there is no general proof of the existence of the core, of Nash
equilibrium or of price taking equilibria that are e±cient over the set of all
feasible allocations. We are left with a choice between models with equilibria
which are e±cient but may not exist, or which exist but may not be e±cient.
In either case, Tiebout's main conjecture remains unproven.
Note that a feature of the continuum models of Tiebout economies just
3Also see Cole and Prescott (1997) for a more recent contribution in this spirit. This
paper shows the existence of valuation equilibrium for lotteries over club memberships and
the equivalence of valuation equilibrium outcomes to the core.
5discussed is that agents are divided into a ¯nite number of jurisdictions.
This means that almost all agents live in jurisdictions with uncountably
in¯nite populations. With a ¯nite number of jurisdictions, at best, only a
zero measure of agents could live in small (meaning ¯nite) towns. Thus,
small jurisdictions or clubs (arising from matching games, for example) are
ruled out.
The ¯nal branch of the literature we discuss suggests a possible solution
to these problems and motivates the approach taken in the current paper.
Wooders (1980) considers a ¯nite economy in which crowding or congestion
limits the size of e±cient jurisdictions to be small compared to the popula-
tion.4 She notes that in such economies, what drives the nonexistence of the
core is that in general, the total number of agents will not be an exact multi-
ple of the e±ciently sized jurisdictions. For example, if optional jurisdictions
consist of ¯ve agents, then when the population is 11, or 101, or 1001, there
are \left-over" agents. Note, however, that as the population grows the pro-
portion of left-overs goes to zero.5 The 1980 model, following Wooders (1978),
is restricted to anonymous crowding. This restriction makes the analysis of
the core especially straightforward since it implies that all improvement can
be carried out by taste-homogeneous coalitions. Wooders (1985,1997)6 ob-
tains similar results for an economy with multiple private and public goods
and di®erentiated crowding, that is when preferences and/or production pos-
sibilities may depend on the types of agents in a given coalition as well as
their numbers.
Wooders' approach suggests three things. First, since the "-core and "-
equilibrium exist for arbitrarily small epsilon if the economy is su±ciently
large, it is probably the case that if the economy were in¯nitely large the
exact core and equilibrium should exist. Second, the continuum limit would
have agents living in ¯nite jurisdictions rather than in jurisdictions of positive
measure. Third, using the Minkowski separating hyperplane theorem to show
existence of equilibrium as in Wooders (1985,1997) does not depend on the
¯niteness of the economy and thus may extend to continuum economies.
The approach we take in this paper is to de¯ne a continuum economy
4Similar models appear in McGuire (1974), Berglas and Pines (1981) and a number of
subsequent papers.
5See Kovalenkov and Wooders (2003) for the most recent results demonstrating
nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games and economies with clubs.
6Related results, for the special case of one private good and one public good are
presented in Scotchmer and Wooders (1986).
6with local public goods by adapting the f-core notion of Kaneko and Wood-
ers (1986,1989) and Hammond, Kaneko and Wooders (1989). Using this,
we show the existence of Pareto e±cient Tiebout equilibria with a contin-
uum of agents. An important aspect of our paper is that jurisdiction sizes
are unbounded. Following Kaneko and Wooders (1986), we require that ad-
missible partitions of individuals into jurisdictions are consistent with the
proportions given by the measure on the set of agents and consist only of
jurisdictions with ¯nite membership. We introduce a more concise statement
of measurement consistency.
Our notion of the core requires that no ¯nite coalition can improve. Since
the number of private goods may be greater than one, improving coalitions
may form multiple jurisdictions and engage in coalition-wide trade in private
goods. In the context of a local public goods economy, the idea that only
¯nite coalitions should be allowed to block feasible allocations is compelling.
Tiebout's argument is based on the implicit assumption that small groups of
agents are su±cient to realize all or almost all gains from cooperation. Per-
mitting or even restricting improvements to coalitions of positive measure (as
in Aumann 1964) would therefore seem to require that blocking jurisdictions
have market power. We note, however, that when small groups are e®ective
our notion of the core and Aumann's turn out to be equivalent (see Kaneko
and Wooders 1986 and the discussion in Section 3).
To summarize, in this paper we introduce a model of an economy with a
continuum of agents, multiple public and private goods, and ¯nite but un-
bounded jurisdictions sizes. Following Conley and Wooders (1997), we make
a distinction between the unobservable taste types of agents and their observ-
able crowding types. The crowding type of an agent determines his e®ects
on other agents and/or on production possibilities. We de¯ne a competi-
tive equilibrium concept in which admission prices for jurisdictions depend
only on observable crowding types of agents. Under apparently mild condi-
tions we show that the core is nonempty. We also show that the set of core
outcomes with the equal treatment property coincides with the set of equi-
librium outcomes. Conditions are described under which all outcomes in the
core have the equal treatment property and we show that they imply that
the core coincides with the equilibrium outcomes. Thus, from nonemptiness
of the core and the equivalence of the core with the competitive outcomes,
we obtain existence of Pareto-e±cient competitive equilibrium. A discussion
of the literature is provided in Section 3.
72 The Model
Let (N;¯;¹) be a measure space where N (the set of agents) is a Borel
subset of a complete separable metric space, let ¯ be a ¾-algebra of all Borel
subsets of N and let ¹ be Lesbegue measure with 0 < ¹ < +1. Each agent
i 2 N is endowed with one of C di®erent sorts of crowding types,7 denoted
c 2 f1;:::;Cg
def = C; and one of T di®erent sorts of taste types, denoted
t 2 f1;:::;Tg
def = T : An element of C £T is typically represented by a pair
(c;t) and is called an agent's type. The assignment of crowding and taste
types to individual agents are given by a pair of attribute functions, denoted,
respectively, by · : N 7! C and ¿ : N 7! T . For each (c;t), and for any
measurable subset S of N; de¯ne
Sct
def = fi 2 S : ·(i) = c and ¿(i) = tg;
the agents of type (c;t) in S;
Sc
def = fi 2 S : ·(i) = cg;
the agents with crowding type c in S;
and
St
def = fi 2 S : ¿(i) = tg,
the agents with taste type t in S:
Note that Sct = St \ Sc:
A jurisdiction G is a ¯nite subset of N. Let F be a given set of (admissi-
ble) jurisdictions. The set F is required to satisfy the property that for each
i 2 N; fig 2 F: For example, the set F may be the set of all ¯nite subsets
of N; or it may be simply the set of all singleton subsets. In the following,
whenever we refer to a jurisdiction, we mean an element of the set F: Note
that if F = ffig 2 Ng, then the economy will have, in e®ect, only private
goods. We observe that the structure can accommodate, as a special case,
assignment or matching models since in these models one choice open to a
player is to remain unmatched.
We describe a jurisdiction by the numbers of agents of each type in the
jurisdiction. Let Z denote the nonnegative integers and let ZCT denote the
7It is easy to generalized this to a crowding type being a point in a ¯nite or in¯nite
dimensional space.
8CT-fold Cartesian product of Z. Given an admissible jurisdiction G 2 F, the
pro¯le of G, denoted by pro(G), is a vector in ZCT de¯ned by its components
pro(G)ct = jGctj
where j¢j denotes the cardinality of a set. The vector pro(G) describes the
jurisdiction G by the number of agents of each type in the jurisdiction.
The crowding pro¯le of a jurisdiction G, denoted by Cpro(G), is a vector
in ZC de¯ned by its components
Cpro(G)c = jGcj:
Symmetrically, the taste pro¯le of G is a vector in ZT, de¯ned by its compo-
nents
T pro(G)t = jGtj:
One of the most crucial concepts in our work is that of an admissible
jurisdiction structure. Since agents consume public goods jointly with other
members of ¯nite jurisdictions, a feasible state of the economy must specify
a partition of the set of agents into ¯nite jurisdictions that is consistent
with the measure on the total player set. Thus, an admissible jurisdiction
structure is a measurement-consistent partition in the sense of Kaneko and
Wooders (1986). We provide here a simpler de¯nition, based on the notion
of index sets.
Let S be a measurable subset of N and let ¼ denote a partition of S into
jurisdictions. An index set of the partition ¼ is a measurable set n ½ S such
that
for each G 2 ¼; jG \ nj = 1;
that is, n contains one and only one member of each jurisdiction G.
Let S be a measurable subset of N: A partition ¼ is an (admissible)
jurisdiction structure of S if:
1. There exists an index set for ¼ (the Axiom of Choice holds) and,
2. For all index sets n and n0 of ¼;
¹(n) = ¹(n
0):
9Example 1. Let N = [0;3) be the set of players endowed with Lebesgue
measure. The agents in [0;1) are girls and those is [1;3) are boys. Intuitively,
there are twice as many boys as girls. Let ¼ be a partition of the player set
into boy-girl pairs given by




that is, girl i is partnered with boy 1+ i
2. Note that every boy has a partner!
Now let n be the index set given by fi : i 2 [0;1)g { the partnerships are
indexed by the girls. Note that ¹(n) = 1. Consider the index set n0 given
by fi : i 2 [1;3)g and note that ¹(n0) = 2. Thus, the measure of the index
set is not constant and ¼ is not measure consistent. In contrast, let ¼0 be the
partition given by
¼
0 = f(i;j) : i 2 [0;1); j = 1 + ig [ fj : j 2 [2;3)g:
This partition re°ects the relative abundances given by the measure and all
index sets n will have the same measure ¹(n) = 2:8 ²
Since nonadmissible jurisdiction structures are not of economic interest,
for simplicity we will often refer to an admissible jurisdiction structure of N
as simply a jurisdiction structure. Given a particular jurisdiction structure
¼ and agent i 2 N, let ¼i denote the jurisdiction in ¼ containing player i.
We consider an economy with L private goods and a metric space of public
projects, denoted by X public; containing a distinguished element denoted by
0.9 A bundle of private goods is denoted by x 2RL
+ and a public project
is denoted by y 2 X public. An endowment is given by a measurable and
integrable function !0 from N to RL such that, for all agents i and j with
¿(i) = ¿(j); it holds that !0(i) = !0(j):





8Our de¯nition of admissible partitions requires that partitions preserve the relative
abundances, given by the measure, of agents of each type. From Lemma A.2 of Kaneko
and Wooders (1986), it follows that our de¯nition of jurisdiction structures coincides with
the Kaneko-Wooders de¯nition of measurement-consistent partitions.
9Following Mas-Colell (1980) for economies with public projects and Manning (1992)
for local public projects, we do not require a linear structure on the space X public: This is
costless { the proofs of our results are the same as in the case where X public is contained
in some ¯nite dimensional Euclidean space.
10where Xct ½ ZCT is the set of pro¯les pro(S) with pro(S)ct 6= 0. Assumptions
(A.1)-(A-2) will be required to hold throughout the paper:
(A.1) Xct is closed in the product topology on RL £ X public £Zct and
(A.2) (!0(i);0;pro(fig)) 2 Xct for all i 2 Nct:
Condition (A.2) dictates that, for each agent; producing \zero" public projects
while consuming his endowment in a jurisdiction consisting of himself alone
is in his consumption set. Note that neither RL
+ nor X public depend on agents'
types. An agent's preferences, however, are only de¯ned over those jurisdic-
tion pro¯les containing agents of his crowding type; if an agent is of type
(c;t) and (x;y;pro(G)) is in Xct, then pro(G)ct is not equal to zero.
The preferences of an agent of type t are described by a continuous utility
function ut mapping Xct into R+ with utility strictly increasing in private





means that an agent of taste type t; in a jurisdiction with pro¯le pro(G0);
enjoys the bundle (x0,y0) of private goods and public projects more than he
would enjoy the bundle (x;y) in a jurisdiction with pro¯le pro(G_ ).
Given i 2 N with ¿(i) = t; de¯ne
ui(x;y;pro(G)) = ut(x;y;pro(G)):
For each taste type t 2 T we make the following assumptions, dictating
that preferences depend only on crowding characteristics of agents in the
same jurisdiction, and not on their preferences:
(A.3) Taste anonymity in consumption (TAC): For all x 2RL
+; y 2 X public
and all G;G0 2 F such that (x;y;pro(G));(x;y;pro(G0)) 2 Xct and
Cpro(G) = Cpro(G0) it holds that ut(x;y;pro(G)) = ut(x;y;pro(G0)):
10These are stronger assumptions than required { in fact, for private goods, we could
use the assumptions of Hammond, Kaneko and Wooders (1989). However, we prefer to
keep our paper more focused on the main issues rather than including generality that does
not illuminate the main issues.
11Production is also subject to crowding. The production technology is
given by a mapping P from the set of pro¯les to nonempty, closed subsets of
RL






and P(pro(G)) represents the technology for all jurisdictions with pro¯le
pro(G).
(A.4) Given a jurisdiction G 2 F and a vector z 2RL
+ the set f(z;y) 2
P(pro(G)) : z 2 RL
+; z · zg is compact.
For our price system to be Pareto-optimal, we require taste anonymity in
production as well as in consumption.
(A.5) Taste anonymity in production (TAP): For all G;G0 2 F such that
Cpro(G) = Cpro(G0) it holds that P(pro(G)) = P(pro(G0)):
To de¯ne feasible states of the economy, we require that any feasible state
is the limit of \f-feasible" states { states of the economy that are feasible
by trade only within ¯nite coalitions. The members of a ¯nite coalition
may divide into many jurisdictions, each providing public projects for their
membership, but feasibility requires that trade of private goods occurs only
among members of a coalition. Thus, we must de¯ne admissible coalitions
structures relative to a given jurisdiction structure ¼. A coalition structure
will be denoted by »:
A pair (»;¼) is an admissible coalition-jurisdiction structure if, for each
coalition W 2 », there is a ¯nite collection of jurisdictions f¼kg such that:
1. » is a coarsening of ¼ :
W = [k¼
k
2. There exists an index set for » and,




11Note that we are taking inputs as nonnegative. This is to facilitate an \input ac-
counting device" introduced later.
12Now we state the following Proposition, relating admissible coalition-
jurisdiction structures and admissible jurisdiction structures.
Proposition 1. Let (»;¼) be an admissible coalition-jurisdiction structure.
Then ¼ is an jurisdiction structure.
A proof of Proposition 1 is provided in Appendix B.
Let S be a measurable subset of N, either ¯nite or in¯nite, and let (»;¼)
be an admissible coalition-jurisdiction structure of S. A feasible state for S
relative to (»;¼) is a list ((»;¼);X;Y;Z;U) where X : S !RL
+ is a private
goods consumption mapping, Y : S ! X public is a public projects consump-
tion mapping, and Z : S !RL is an input accounting device, such that:
1. For almost all i;j 2 S if ¼i = ¼j then Y (i) = Y (j) (if two agents are
in the same jurisdiction then they consume the same public projects):
2. For almost all i 2 S; (X(i);Y (i);pro(¼i)) 2 X·(i)¿(i) (except for possibly
a set of measure zero, the consumption bundle of each agent is in his
consumption set):
3. The public projects consumption and production mappings are feasible:
(a) For almost all i 2 S it holds that (
P
j2¼iZ(j);Y (j)) 2 P(pro(¼i));
and
(b) The distribution of private projects is feasible. That is, for each




0(i) ¡ X(i) ¡ Z(i)) ¸ 0:
4. U : S !R is a mapping satisfying
U(i) = ui(Xi;Yi;pro(¼i)) for each i 2 N
except possibly for a subset of measure zero.
13Remark. Note that in the above de¯nition we \assigned" to each individual
i inputs Z(i) of private goods used to produce public projects in the juris-
diction containing that individual { inputs are indexed by individuals { so to
sum inputs, we can sum over individuals. Thus, total input in jurisdiction
¼i of private goods into production of public projects is given by
P
j2¼i Z(j).
This accounting device Z is simply for convenience. An alternative approach
would be to de¯ne another variable, say b Z, so that b Z(¼i) is the total input
used in the jurisdiction containing agent i; we could then sum inputs over
an index set for the partition ¼. For convenience, however, we follow the
convention of 3(b).
We will now de¯ne feasible states of the economy for a measurable subset
S ½ N and a jurisdiction structure ¼. De¯ne FS(¼) by
FS(¼) = f(X;Y;Z;U) : there is an admissible coalition-jurisdiction structure (»;¼)
and a feasible state of the economy ((»;¼);X0;Y 0;Z0) relative to (»;¼)
such that X = X0; Y 0 = Y; Z = Z0 and U0 = Ug:
The set FS(¼) includes all feasible states relative to a given jurisdiction
structure ¼. We now take unions over all jurisdiction structures and limits.
De¯ne the sets F ¤
S(¼), and F ¤
S, by
F ¤
S(¼) = f(X¤;Y ¤;Z¤;U¤) : for some sequence f(Xº;Y º;Zº;Uº)g in FS(¼),










The set F ¤
S consists of the feasible states of the economy for S.13
Our next assumption is crucial for existence of equilibrium and is an
adaptation of an assumption of the same name in earlier research on ¯nite
13See Hammond, Kaneko and Wooders (1989) for motivation for taking the closure with
respect to convergence in measure.
14economies with one private good and in cooperative games with many play-
ers.14 We assume:
(A.6) Strict small group e®ectiveness (SSGE), that is, there is a bound B
such that for each (X¤;Y ¤;Z¤;U¤) 2 F ¤
S there is a jurisdiction structure
¼ such that jGj · B for all G 2 ¼ and (X¤;Y ¤;Z¤;U¤) 2 F ¤
S(¼):
This assumption ensures that, in a continuum economy, where all possibilities
for gains to trade in private goods can be realized, only jurisdictions bounded
in size are required to realize all gains to jurisdiction formation. Note that
SSGE as de¯ned here does not limit trade in private goods to ¯nite coalitions.
Also, arbitrarily large jurisdictions are not ruled out; it is only assumed that
anything large jurisdictions can do can also be achieved by a partition of the
agents into jurisdictions bounded in size.
Example 2. Let us ¯rst consider a very simple case with two private goods,
x1 and x2, where half the agents are endowed with one unit of x1 and the other
half are endowed with one unit of x2 and, for completeness, X public = f0g.








n, n · 100
x1x2 + 10 otherwise
where n is a ¯nite number of people in a jurisdiction. In any such ¯nite
economy (with a ¯nite set of agents), the core is not equal to the competitive
outcomes since, because the opportunities for trade in private goods increase
as the size of the economy increases, the opportunities for improvement by
coalitions correspondingly increase. Yet, gains to jurisdiction formation are
exhausted by ¯nite jurisdictions. Our result shows that in the limiting con-
tinuum economy, with SSGE the core coincides with the set of price taking
equilibria. ²
14This condition grows out of a condition in Wooders (1983), called `minimum e±-
cient scale,' following an analogous condition in Novshek and Sonnenschein (1982) for
production functions. We refer the reader to Kovalenkov and Wooders (2003) for further
references to this condition.
15Let S be a measurable subset of N. A state of the economy (¼;X;Y;Z;U) 2
F ¤
S has the equal treatment property if there is a subset S0 of S of full measure
(¹(S0) = ¹(S)) such that:
for almost all i;j 2 N, if (·(i);¿(i)) = (·(j);¿(j)) then
U(i) = U(j):
Let (¼;X;Y;Z;U) 2 F ¤
N be a state of the economy N. A measurable sub-
set S ½ N of the total population of agents improves upon (¼;X;Y;Z;U) with
a feasible state of the economy for S; say (¼0;X0;Y 0;Z0) 2 F ¤







Consistent with our motivation, we require that improving coalitions to be
¯nite.
The f-core, or simply the core, of the economy consists of those states
of the economy (¼;X;Y;Z;U) 2 F ¤
N with the property that, for some sub-
set of agents N0 ½ N of full measure, there is no ¯nite coalition S ½ N0
that can improve upon (¼;X;Y;Z;U). The equal-treatment core consists of
those states of the economy (¼;X;Y;Z;U) 2 F ¤
N in the core with the equal
treatment property:
In the appendix, we prove that SSGE implies the following condition
(A.7). Our ¯rst theorem requires per capita boundedness of utility of ¯nite
coalitions in the neighborhood of the population proportions given by the
measure, as de¯ned in Kaneko and Wooders (1986).
(A.7) The economy is per capita bounded if there are positive numbers ± and
K; with 0 < ± < 1; such that for every ¯nite subset S ½ N and for any





jSj ¸ (1 ¡ ±)
¹(Nct)
¹(N) for all (c;t) 2 C £ T
) U(i) · K for all i 2 S:
Theorem 1. Nonemptiness of the core of the game generated by the econ-
omy. Under assumptions (A.1)-(A.2), (A.4) and (A.6), the equal-treatment
16core of the game generated by the economy is nonempty.15 Furthermore,
there is at least one outcome in the core with the equal treatment property.
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof of this result is a straightforward appli-
cation of the main result of Kaneko and Wooders (1986). In Appendix B we
provide an informal discussion.




The value Ãc(y;Cpro(S)) of the mapping Ãc at (y;Cpro(S)) is interpreted as
the amount of money that an agent of crowding type c is required to pay
to join a jurisdiction with crowding pro¯le Cpro(S) and consume the vector
y of public projects. A price system Ã for public projects is a collection of
price systems, one for each crowding type.
In the following de¯nition, note that, as in the de¯nition of a feasible state,
for the purposes of adding up the total input of private goods into public
project production, we distribute the private good inputs in a jurisdiction
among the members of the jurisdiction.
An equilibrium is a state of the economy (¼;X;Y;Z;U) 2 F ¤
N for N;
a price system p 2RL
+ for private goods, and a price system Ã for public
projects such that:
1. For almost all i 2 N;(X(i);Y (i);Cpro(¼i)) 2 X·(i)¿(i) and
p ¢ X(i) + Ã·(i)(Y (i);Cpro(¼i))) = p ¢ !
0(i):
2. For almost all i 2 N; for all jurisdictions G 2 F such that i 2 G; for
all possible bundles of private goods x 2RL




p ¢ x + Ã·(i)(y;Cpro(G))) > p ¢ !
0(i):
15For a formal de¯nition of the game generated by the economy, see Appendix 1. As
usual, the payo® sets for the game generated by an economy consist of functions from N to
utilities. We also note that the anonymity assumptions (A.3) and (A.5) are not required
for this result.
173. For almost all i 2 N
X
j2¼i




4. For every G 2 F; there does not exist (z;y) 2 P(pro(G)) such that
X
j2G
Ã·(j)(y;Cpro(G)) ¡ p ¢ z > 0:
Theorem 2: An equilibrium state of the economy is in the core. If a fea-
sible state of the economy (¼;X;Y;Z;U) 2 F ¤
N and price systems p and
Ã constitute an equilibrium, then (¼;X;Y;Z;U) is in the core.
Proof. See the Appendix.16
Next we demonstrate an equal treatment theorem, extending the equal-
treatment property of the core of replicated exchange economies and games
with strictly e®ective small groups to continuum economies with local public
projects. This depends on our assumption that agents of the same taste type
have the same endowment17 and on two additional assumptions.




for any y 2 X public and any jurisdiction G containing agent i.
16Theorem 2 is proven using the game-theoretic notion of the core, where all members of
an improving coalition must be better o®. In general, this leads to a larger core than the
notion frequently used in economics, where all members of an improving coalition must be
at least as well o® and one must be strictly better o®. The Theorem is also easily proven
for this alternative notion of the core.
17The equal treatment property of the core has a long history in economics, going back
to Shubik (1959) and Debreu and Scarf (1963). The equal-treatment property of the core
for replicated NTU games with strictly e®ective small groups is shown in Wooders (1983).
18Assumption (A.8) dictates that the endowment is preferred to any bundle
containing zero private goods.18 This assumption ensures that in an indi-
vidually rational state of the economy, each individual will consume some
positive amount of private goods.
Theorem 3. The equal treatment property of the core. Assume (A.1)-(A.2)
(A.4), (A.6) and (A.8). Then there exists a feasible state of the economy
(¼;X;Y;Z;U) in the core. Moreover, there is a subset N0 ½ N, ¹(N0) =
¹(N); such that for every pair of agents i;j 2 N0 satisfying ¿(i) = ¿(j) and
·(i) = ·(j) it holds that
U(i) = U(j):
Proof of Theorem 3. See the Appendix.
Theorem 3 is used in our proof of the equivalence of the core and the
equilibrium states of the economy.
Theorem 4. Equivalence of the equal-treatment core and the equilibrium
states of the economy. Let (¼;X;Y;Z;U) 2 F ¤
N be an equal-treatment core
state of the economy satisfying (A.1)-(A.6)and (A.8). Then there is a price
system p for private goods and a price system Ã for public projects such that
(¼;X;Y;Z;U); p and Ã constitute an equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 4. See the Appendix.
Theorem 5. Existence of equilibrium. Assume that the economy satis¯es
(A.1)-(A.6) and (A.8). Then there exists an equilibrium for the economy.
Proof of Theorem 5. From Theorem 3 the equal-treatment core is
nonempty. From Theorem 4 every state of the economy in the equal-treatment
core is an equilibrium state. Thus, an equilibrium exists.
The following Theorem concludes our results.
Theorem 6. Core-equilibrium equivalence. Assume that the economy sat-
is¯es (A.1)-(A.6) and (A.8). Then an equilibrium exists and the set of equi-
librium states of the economy is equivalent to the core.
18This assumption also appears in Hammond, Kaneko and Wooders (1989), Kaneko and
Wooders (1989) and Ellickson et al. (2001).
19Proof of Theorem 6. This is immediate from Theorem 2, Theorem 3, and
Theorem 4.
3 Some further remarks on the literature
Before concluding, we contrast our work to some other approaches to con-
tinuum economies with small e®ective groups.
1. Our notion of feasibility follows Kaneko and Wooders (1986) and Ham-
mond, Kaneko and Wooders (1989). It is well-known that in models
with a continuum of agents and ¯nite, but unbounded coalition sizes,
the set of feasible allocations may not be closed (cf. Hammond, Kaneko
and Wooders (1989)). Thus, the feasible set is taken as the closure of
the set of allocations (or, for games, the set of payo®s) that are achiev-
able by trade only within ¯nite coalitions. When this closure is taken,
the set of allocations that are \f-feasible" is equivalent to the set of
Aumann-feasible allocations, as in Aumann (1964) (see Kaneko and
Wooders 1986). For the purposes of the current paper, we wish to
treat ¯nite jurisdictions but to allow the same set of feasible trades
as in the extant literature on economies with private goods. Thus,
relative to any jurisdiction structure ¼ we allow trade within arbitrar-
ily large coalitions (coarsening of the jurisdiction structure) and then
take the closure with respect to convergence in measure. Relative to
that jurisdiction structure, this allows us to capture the same set of
feasible trades as in the Aumann approach to the continuum. We then
assume that all gains to forming jurisdictions are realizable by juris-
dictions structures bounded in size. This allows all possible gains to
trade of private goods to be captured by arbitrarily large coalitions,
while maintaining the feature that jurisdictions are ¯nite.
2. An important feature of our research is that jurisdiction sizes are un-
bounded. Thus, for a given composition of the jurisdiction, there may
be constant returns to increasing size of the jurisdiction. This is an
important aspect of our research, creating new problems for existence
of equilibrium and requiring some subtlety and new approaches in our
proof techniques. In particular, even though we can ignore sets of
20players of measure zero and thus e®ectively have `thickness' of the to-
tal agent set, the equal treatment property of all outcomes in the core
{ essential for equivalence of the set of outcomes in the core and the
set of equilibrium outcomes { is not immediate. Moreover, the per-
centages of agents of each type could be bounded away from zero and
the same di±culties would appear. This is in contrast, for example,
to the situation of games with transferable utility and what motivates
our particular form of strict small group e®ectiveness. We note that
another recent paper, Allouch and Wooders (2004), allows unbounded
jurisdiction sizes in large ¯nite economies. There are a number of dis-
tinctions between their work and ours; Allouch and Wooders treat
large ¯nite economies and the core notion introduced involves com-
munication costs in the formation of jurisdictions. Also, they treat
economies where agents may belong to multiple clubs or jurisdictions.
A major di®erence between the two models is that Allouch and Wood-
ers allow forever strictly increasing returns to jurisdiction size and the
only optimal jurisdiction structure may the jurisdiction consisting of
the entire population. This creates di±culties in the de¯nition of a
limit economy. Moreover, with forever increasing returns to jurisdic-
tion size, exact equal treatment of identical agents need not hold and
equilibrium need be only approximately Pareto e±cient.
3. There are some relationships between this paper and Ellickson et al.
(1997). Recall that Ellickson (1979) treats local public goods as indivis-
ible private commodities. Ellickson et al. (1999) adopt the approach of
Ellickson (1979) to study a local public goods economy similar to those
of Conley and Wooders (1997) and Cole and Prescott (1997). By ¯xing
a ¯nite menu of admissible sorts of club types and allowing only a ¯nite
number of distinct public projects, Ellickson et al. are able to adopt
techniques from ¯nite-dimensional private goods exchange economies
to prove existence and equivalence. In Ellickson et al., as in Shubik
and Wooders (1982), agents are permitted to join several clubs as op-
posed to requiring that agents join one and only one jurisdiction as
would be appropriate in a local public goods context. In this respect,
their paper is more general than the current work, although extending
our model to include multiple memberships does not appear to present
any great di±culties. A major di®erence between our model and that
of Ellickson et al is that we allow unbounded club sizes. This means we
21must invent a new approach to demonstrating existence of equilibrium.
4. There is an important di®erence between the approach of this paper,
allowing public projects with minimal assumptions on production, and
the approach of Wooders (1985,1997) for growing sequences of ¯nite
economies.19 Recall that Wooders' model required that production sets
for public goods be closed convex cones and that pricing was di®erenti-
ated { that is, prices for public goods were based on agents' types where
\`type" included taste type. Our model does not require these restric-
tions. In the course of our proof, following Wooders's earlier papers,
we de¯ne preferred sets of net trades of private goods for jurisdictions,
Wooders obtained existence of equilibrium prices for private goods by
separating the preferred sets of jurisdictions from the origin. We also
use such a separating hyperplane argument, but we separate only pre-
ferred sets for jurisdictions in the core from the origin. From the prices
for private goods thus determined, we are able to construct prices for
public projects for all jurisdictions. To the best of our knowledge, there
is no precedent for this technique.
5. We conclude by noting the di®erence between the f-core and the \¯nite
core" (see Keiding 1976 and references therein). The ¯nite core allows
improvement by ¯nite coalitions, but imposes a feasibility requirement
independent of any measure on the set of agents. Thus, relative scarci-
ties of agent types and commodities { the sine qua non of economics {
are ignored. This has the consequence that the ¯nite core is not nec-
essarily the limit of approximate cores of large economies.20 Consider,
for example, a sequence of ¯nite matching games with transferable util-
ity and with two types of players { males and females. Suppose there
are twice as many females as males. Since males are relatively scarce,
for any ¯nite game the core assigns all gains to marriage to males;
females receive only their individually rational payo®. Now suppose
there is a continuum of players and twice as many females as males.
19Wooders (1985,1997) use the same proof of convergence, except the later paper shows
that the prices for public goods derived in the proofs of the earlier papers are Lindahl
and also determine admission prices. Conley and Wooders (1994) discusses the di®erences
between Lindahl pricing and admission pricing.
20Kaneko and Wooders (1989) show that for private goods economies the continuum
with ¯nite coalitions is the limit of large ¯nite economies with relatively small e®ective
coalitions. This also holds for games.
22The f-core assigns all gains to marriage to males. In contrast, with
Keiding's notion of feasibility, any Pareto-optimal and individually ra-
tional equal-treatment payo® is in the ¯nite core.
4 Conclusions
The point of this paper has been to con¯rm Tiebout's hypothesis that when
public goods are local, markets are able to decentralize the e±cient outcomes.
Traditionally, there has been a trade-o® in the literature. On the one hand,
it is has been widely demonstrated that, without special assumptions, both
the core and competitive equilibrium may fail to exist in ¯nite economies.
De¯ning equilibrium notions that can be shown to exist, on the other hand,
typically involves restricting agents' alternatives to a subset of all feasible
allocations (for example, requiring that agents always share the cost of public
goods equally or restricting the menu of admissible clubs to an arbitrary,
¯nite subset of the feasible set). Thus, although these equilibrium exist,
at best they are only to be Pareto optimal within the constraints imposed
and not over the whole feasible set. In addition, it is often the case that
many other equilibria also exist which do not even satisfy this constrained
optimality.
The intuition for our results comes the ²-equilibrium Tiebout literature.
This literature suggests that the failure of existence is caused by the pres-
ence of a group of \left-over" agents who cannot ¯nd placement in optimal
jurisdictions. In the continuum limit, the problem of left-over agents disap-
pears. Extending the intuition of "-cores to economies with a continuum of
agents creates both technical and intuitive problems. Much of the literature
supposes that agents end up in an ¯nite number of in¯nitely large jurisdic-
tions in equilibrium. This re°ects neither everyday observation, nor is it the
limiting case of the ²-equilibrium.
These considerations motivate our use of an f-core approach in an en-
vironment with local public goods and production of both public and pri-
vate goods. This economy allows the multiple private goods to be traded
freely across jurisdictional boundaries, but requires that crowding and public
projects be consumed only within jurisdictions. The space of public projects
we consider is quite abstract and does not require any linear structure, but
includes standard in¯nitely divisible public goods as a special case. The
most innovative part of this paper is showing the equivalence of the equal-
23treatment core and the competitive outcomes, thereby obtaining existence of
equilibrium in a novel way.
Our main result is that under fairly standard conditions on production
and preferences, the core is nonempty and is equivalent to the set of anony-
mous admission price equilibrium outcomes. Thus, Tiebout's hypothesis is
con¯rmed in the sense that except for at most a negligible fraction of agents,
competitive equilibria exist and are ¯rst best.
There are several ways in which the research of this paper might be fur-
thered. In particular, what prevents the proving a second welfare theorem
in the case of a ¯nite Tiebout economy is the general failure of existence of
competitive equilibrium. Thus, we speculate that it should be possible to
prove a second welfare theorem in the generality of our model. We have also
treated crowding characteristics as exogenously given (for example gender,
race or intelligence might be externality producing characteristics that are
exogenous to agents). It would be interesting to extend this model to en-
dogenously chosen externality producing characteristics like skills or being a
smoker as in Conley and Wooders (1997), for example. Finally, it should be
possible to prove results similar to those given in this paper when agents are
allowed to join more than one club at a time. The modeling challenge, as we
perceive it, is to maintain measurement-consistency while allowing agents to
join an arbitrary number of clubs, each of which may be able to produce an
arbitrary level of public goods.
5 Appendix A
For the convenience of the reader, we ¯rst list the assumptions:
(A.1) Xct is closed in the product topology on RL £ X public £Zct and
(A.2) (!0(i);0;pro(fig)) 2 Xct for all i 2 Nct:
(A.3) Taste anonymity in consumption (TAC): For all x 2RL
+; y 2 X public
and all G;G0 2 F such that (x;y;pro(G));(x;y;pro(G0)) 2 Xct and
Cpro(G) = Cpro(G0) it holds that ut(x;y;pro(G)) = ut(x;y;pro(G0)):
(A.4) Given a jurisdiction G 2 F and a vector z 2 RL
+ the set f(z;y) 2
P(pro(G)) : z 2 RL
+; z · zg is compact.
24(A.5) Taste anonymity in production (TAP): For all G;G0 2 F such that
Cpro(G) = Cpro(G0) it holds that P(pro(G)) = P(pro(G0)):
(A.6) small groups are strictly e®ective (SSGE), that is, there is a bound B
such that for each (X¤;Y ¤;Z¤;U¤) 2 F ¤
S there is a jurisdiction struc-
ture ¼ such that jGj · B for all G 2 ¼ and (X¤;Y ¤;Z¤;U¤) 2 F ¤
S(¼):
This assumption ensures that, in a continuum economy, where all pos-
sibilities for gains to trade in private goods can be realized, only juris-
dictions bounded in size are required to realize all gains to jurisdiction
formation.
(A.7) The economy is per capita bounded if there are positive numbers ± and
K; with 0 < ± < 1; such that for every ¯nite subset S ½ N and for any





jSj ¸ (1 ¡ ±)
¹(Nct)
¹(N) for all (c;t) 2 C £ T
) u¿(i)(X(i);Y (i);pro(¼i)) · K for all i 2 S:




for any y 2 X public and any jurisdiction G containing agent i.
Theorem 2: An equilibrium state of the economy is in the core. If a feasible
state of the economy (¼;X;Y;Z;U) and price systems p and Ã constitute an
equilibrium, then (¼;X;Y;Z;U) is in the core.
Proof of Theorem 2. Suppose that a feasible state of the economy (¼;X;Y;Z;U);
a price system p 2RL for private goods and a price system Ã for public
projects constitute an equilibrium. Thus, there exists a subset N0 of N with
the property that ¹(N0) = ¹(N) and, for all i 2 N0 and jurisdictions ¼i ,
conditions 1-4 of the de¯nition of an equilibrium are satis¯ed. Suppose the
25equilibrium is not in the core. Then there is at least one ¯nite coalition, say
W ½ N0, a feasible state of the economy for W say (¼0;X0;Y 0;Z0) that can










0(i) ¡ X(i) ¡ Z(i)) = 0:





i)) > p ¢ !
0(i):
From the condition of equilibrium that pro¯ts are nonpositive for juris-































































26Theorem 3. The equal treatment property of the core. Assume (A.1)-(A.2)
(A.4), (A.6) and (A.8) then there exists a feasible state of the economy
(¼;X;Y;Z;U) in the core of the economy. Moreover, there is a subset N0 ½
N, ¹(N0) = ¹(N); such that for every pair of agents i;j 2 N0 satisfying
¿(i) = ¿(j) and ·(i) = ·(j) it holds that
u¿(i)(X(i);Y (i);pro(¼i)) = u¿(j)(X(j);Y (j);pro(¼j)):
Proof of Theorem 3.
Let h : N !R be in the equal treatment core of the game generated by
the economy. Note that by Theorem 1, such a function exists. Then there
is a sequence fhºg converging to h such that, for each i 2 N0, there exists a
sequence of coalition-jurisdiction structures f(»º;¼º)gº and, a feasible state





i )) ¸ h
º(i):
From the SSGE assumption we can restrict ourselves to a ¯nite number of
pro¯les possible for all jurisdiction structures. Let fpro1;:::;prok;:::;proKg
denote the set of all possible pro¯les where prok 2 ZCT: We consider the
following space A =RCTK where C is the number of crowding types, T is
the number of taste types and K is the number of all possible pro¯les for




C;T) and for each c;t, ak
c;t = prok
c;t 2R. For each agent i,
for each º; we consider aº
i 2 A such that ak
c;t equals one if ·(i) = c; ¿(i) =
t and pro(¼º
i ) = prok and equals zero otherwise. Also, let ¹ 1 2 A; such that
ak
c;t equals one for all c;t and k:























Then we can apply Fatou's Lemma in m¡dimensions (Hildenbrand, 1974, p.
69, Lemma 3 ) to this sequence and state that there is an integrable function
( ¹ X + ¹ Z;¹ a) such that ( ¹ Xi + ¹ Zi;¹ ai) 2 LimSup(Xº
i + Zº
i ;aº
i) for each i, and
Z















i is a discrete sequence any convergent subsequence is constant
after some rank and therefore (Xº
i ;Y º
i ;Zº
i ) 2 F ¤
N(¼) for some jurisdiction
structure ¼. Then one obtains ( ¹ Xi; ¹ Yi; ¹ Zi) 2 F ¤
N. Moreover, from Fatou's
Lemma there is a subsequence (Xº¸
i ;Y º¸
i ;Zº¸






Taking the limit one obtains
u¿(i)( ¹ X(i); ¹ Y (i);pro(¼i)) ¸ u·(i)¿(i):
One concludes that (¼;X;Y;Z;U) belongs to the f-core.
Next we will show the equal treatment property for some allocations in
the core. From the f-core de¯nition we know that the core payo® for each
agent i is individually rational, that is to say,
h(i) ¸ u¿(i)(!
0(i);0;pro(fig)):
From (A.9) (Desirability of the endowment of divisible private goods) it
follows that:
u¿(i)(!
0(i);0;pro(fig)) > u¿(i)(0; ¹ Y (i);pro(¼i)):
Therefore one obtains for each agent i
u¿(i)( ¹ X(i); ¹ Y (i);pro(¼i)) ¸ h(i) > u¿(i)(0; ¹ Y (i);pro(¼i)):
From the continuity of the utility functions for each agent i there exists
0 < ¸i · 1 such that
u¿(i)(¸i ¹ X(i); ¹ Y (i);pro(¼i)) = h(i)
We posit ¹ X0(i) = ¸i ¹ X(i). It is clear that (¼; ¹ X0; ¹ Y ; ¹ Z) belongs to the
f-core and satis¯es the equal treatment property.
Theorem 4. Equivalence of the equal-treatment core and the equilibrium
states of the economy. Let (¼;X;Y;Z;U) be an equal-treatment core state
28of the economy satisfying (A.1)-(A.6) and (A.8). Then there is a price sys-
tem p for private goods and a price system Ã for public projects such that
(¼;X;Y;Z;U); p and Ã constitute an equilibrium.
Sketch of the proof of Theorem 4. In Step 1, we obtain the existence of a
price system, say p; for private goods for a ¯nite approximating economy. To
obtain this result, we follow a technique arising from Debreu-Scarf (1963), of
separating preferred sets from the origin. Instead of considering the preferred
sets of individual consumers as in Debreu-Scarf (1963) and Foley (1970), we
consider preferred sets for jurisdictions, as in Wooders (1985,1997) and treat
the preferred sets of private goods for jurisdictions, for all jurisdictions in ¼:
A point in the preferred set of a jurisdiction is an amount of private goods
su±ciently large so that, with this amount of resources, it is possible for all
members of the jurisdiction to be better o® than they are in the state of the
economy in the core. In Step 2, it is veri¯ed that p satis¯es the conditions of
the Theorem. Finally, in Step 3, using the same techniques as in Conley and
Wooders (1997) for a one-private-good case, the price system Ã is constructed
from the price system p: Step 4 completes the proof by showing that all the
properties of a competitive equilibrium are satis¯ed.
Proof of Theorem 4.
Preliminaries. Let (¼;X;Y;Z;U) be an equal-treatment state of the econ-
omy in the core. From the equal treatment property, in (¼;X;Y;Z;U) almost
all agents of the same type receive the same utility levels. For an agent of
type (c;t) let U(c;t) denote this utility level.
Let N0 be a subset of N with the property that ¹(N0) = ¹(N) and, if
i 2 N0 and (·(i);¿(i)) = (c;t) then there is an in¯nite number of agents in
N0 of type (c;t):
Step 1.
Let G denote the collection of all possible jurisdictions G contained in
N0. For each G 2 G let ­G denote the set of private goods bundles b in RL
with the properties that, for each i 2 G; there is an xi 2RL
+ such that:
u¿(i)(x





i ¡ Z(i) ¡ w
0(i));
where U(c;t) is the utility assigned to agents of type (c;t) in the core allo-
cation. The set ­G is a subset of RL; called the preferred set for G. For
jurisdiction G; ­G describes the set of required aggregate net trades (or
transfers) of private goods with the property that there is some production
of public projects and some distribution of private goods so that, for each
member of the jurisdiction, the given allocation is preferred to the allocation
which he is assigned in the initially given state of the economy (¼;X;Y;Z):
(Note that ­G may be empty.)
Let ­ denote the convex hull of the union [G2G­G. We next show that
0 = 2 ­: First, suppose that 0 2 ­: Then, since ­ ½RL is the convex hull of
the sets f­Gg; there is:
(i) a ¯nite collection of jurisdictions G0 ½ G and a convex combination of
weights ¸G; G 2 G0 satisfying 0 < ¸G · 1 and
P
G2G0
¸G = 1; and
(ii) for each G 2 G0 and each i 2 G, there is a private goods consumption





i2G (xi ¡ Z(i) ¡ !0(i)))], and
(c) u¿(i)(xi;Y (i);pro(G)) > U(c;t):
From continuity and monotonicity of preferences, the sets ­G are open.
Therefore, if any of the weights ¸G are irrational, we can perturb the al-
locations of private goods xi so that (a) and (b) are satis¯ed with rational
weights ¸G. Thus, we suppose, without loss of generality, that the weights
¸G; G 2 G0, are all rational numbers.
Let r be an integer such that r¸G is an integer for all G 2 G0. It holds
that r
P
G2G0 ¸Gpro(G) 2 ZCT: Let W denote a ¯nite set of agents of agents








Therefore the coalition W can improve upon the state of the economy (¼;X;Y;Z;U)
for its members and we have a contradiction to the supposition that (¼;X;Y;Z;U)
is in the core. Thus, 0= 2­.
30From the fact that ­ is convex and 0= 2­ it follows that there exists a
price system p for private goods that separates the preferred sets for jurisdic-
tions G in G0 from their a®ordable net trades of private commodities. From
monotonicity of preferences, it follows that p` > 0 for each private good
` = 1;:::;L:
Step 2. A private-goods price system for the continuum economy.
Let ¼0 denote the jurisdiction structure ¼ restricted to agents contained in
N0. We now show that p satis¯es the properties that (a) for almost all agents
i 2 N0 it holds that the jurisdiction ¼0
i can a®ord its bundle of private goods
and (b) except possibly for a set of measure zero, no jurisdiction G 2 ¼0 of
consumers could be better o® given prices p. Observe that for each G 2 ¼0
from the de¯nition of ­ and the continuity of utility functions it holds that
for any i 2 G;
P
j2¼0
i[X(j) + Z(j) ¡
P
j2¼0
i !0(j)] is in the closure of ­G.











From feasibility we obtain
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Thus, for almost all agents i 2 N0; the jurisdiction ¼i can a®ord the allocation
for its members given by (¼;X;Y;Z;U).
Step 4. A public-goods price system. We must now construct prices
for public projects. Here we follow the techniques of Conley and Wooders
(1997). Although this paper only has one private good, once prices for private
goods are given the problem becomes quite similar to the problem in the
one-private-good case. The following Lemma is that analogue of Conley and
Wooders (1997, Theorem 2).
The following Lemma demonstrates that any two agents of the same
crowding type in the same jurisdiction must make the same contribution (in
terms of monetary worth) to public project provision.
31Lemma 1. Let (¼;X;Y;Z;U) be a state of the economy in the core. Let
p be as determined above. Then for any c 2 C and any pair of agents
i1 2 ¼i1; i2 2 ¼i2; with ·(i1) = ·(i2) = c; and¿i1 =i2 it holds that
p ¢ (!
0(i1) ¡ X(i1)) = p ¢ (!
0(i2) ¡ X(i2)):
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose not. Suppose that
p ¢ (!
0(i1) ¡ X(i1)) > p ¢ (!
0(i2) ¡ X(i2)):
From Theorem 4 and from the fact that jurisdictions are ¯nite (and thus, of
measure zero), there is an agent i3 in another jurisdiction who is identical
to i1 and, from the equal treatment property of the core, receiving the same
utility as i1 in the core state of the economy. More formally, there is an agent
i3 = 2 ¼i1 satisfying
·(i3) = ·(i1); ¿(i3) = ¿(i1)
and
u¿(i3)(X(i3);Y (i3);¼i3) = u¿(i1)(X(i1);Y (i1);¼i1):
Now consider the jurisdiction G¤ formed by replacing i2 with i3;
G
¤ def = ¼i1 [ fi3gnfi2g:
Construct the allocation for G¤ with consumption of public projects equal
to Y (i) for each agent i 2 G¤ and with consumptions of private goods of
X(i) for all i 2 G¤; i 6= i3; and with the allocation xi3 = X(i1) { we have
simply replaced i2 by i3 and given i3 the same allocation as i1: Note that,
from (1), the jurisdiction G¤ can a®ord this allocation of private goods and
the required input of private goods into production and have a surplus of
p¢(!0(i)¡X(i))¡p¢(!0(j)¡X(j)). From strict monotonicity of preferences
for private goods, the membership of G¤ can a®ord a bundle of private goods
for private consumption and for public project production that would make
all members of G better o® than they are in the initial state of the economy
(¼;X;Y;Z;U): In particular, each agent's allocation of all private goods could
be increased and the aggregate budget constraint for the jurisdiction G¤
would still be satis¯ed. This contradicts the fact that p separates preferred
sets from a®ordable bundles of private goods.¥
32For each crowding type c and any agent i with crowding type ·(i) = c in
a jurisdiction with crowding pro¯le Cpro(¼i), de¯ne
Ãc(Y (i);Cpro(¼i)) = p ¢ (!
0(i) ¡ X(i)):
Note that for any two agents i and i0 with the same crowding type in the same
jurisdiction, from the above argument p¢(!0(i)¡X(i)) = p¢(!0(i0)¡X(i0))
(irrespective of their tastes) so Ãc(Y (i);Cpro(¼i)) is well de¯ned and does
not depend on tastes. This is a key result, since it is crucial for the result
that prices need not depend on tastes.
It remains to specify public projects and prices for these projects for
jurisdictions that do not appear in the core state.
Consider an arbitrary jurisdiction G 2 F and an arbitrary crowding type
c 2 C with the property that Cpro(G)c 6= 0: Let (z;y) 2 P(pro(G)) and
suppose that there does not appear a jurisdiction G0 with pro(G0) = pro(G)
o®ering public projects y in the core state of the economy. Now take an
arbitrary agent i 2 G of type c (or any agent i in any jurisdiction G0 with
the same pro¯le) and consider how much he would be willing to pay to
join the jurisdiction G o®ering the public projects bundle y. There are two
possibilities. (1) It may be that this jurisdiction and public project package
are so unattractive that if the agent were a member of G, no amount of
income could make him as well o® as he is in the core state. (2) There is an
amount of income that is feasible for the agent to pay (his \willingness to
pay"), and that leaves him exactly indi®erent between G and the jurisdiction
to which he is assigned in the core state. From desirability of the endowment
for private goods (A.8), we have only these two possibilities. This creates a
partition of the set of agents of crowding type c:
Hc(y;pro(G))
def = fi 2 Nc : for all x 2 RL
+;
ui(x;y;pro(G)) < ui(X(i);Y (i);¼i)g;
and
Ic(y;pro(G))
def = fi 2 Nc : there exists x 2 RL
+ such that
ui(x;y;pro(G)) = ui(X(i);Y (i);pro(¼i))g
33Note that if i and i0 are members of Ic(y;pro(G)), while they both have
crowding type c their taste types may di®er.
For each crowding type c, for agents in the set Ic(y;pro(G)) their will-
ingness to pay to join the jurisdiction G is well-de¯ned. Given c, de¯ne the
maximum willingness to pay over all taste types of crowding type c repre-
sented in the jurisdiction G as follows:
MaxWTPc(y;pro(G)) = maxi2Ic(y;pro(G)) supx2RL
+fp ¢ !0(i) ¡ p ¢ x:
ui(x;y;pro(G)) = ui(X(i);Y (i);pro(¼i))g
Given any " > 0, we can think of MaxWTPc(y;pro(G)) + " as a su±ciently
high price to discourage all agents in Ic(y;pro(G)) from choosing the package
(y;pro(G)) since doing so would make them worse o® than in the core state.
To complete the price system, choose " > 0 and let the admission price







" if [t Gct ½ Hc(y;pro(G)):




Here, if all agents of crowding type c in G ¯nd G very unattractive { so much
so that no amount of income would make them as well o® in G o®ering the
public projects y as in the core state { then the admission price for agents
of crowding type c for this jurisdiction is negative. In the other case, the
price is de¯ned so that even those agents of the taste type that ¯nd G and
y most attractive are indi®erent between G o®ering y and the core state of
the economy. We spell this out in more detail.
Suppose that case (a) obtains. Then except possibly for a set of measure
zero, no amount of income is su±cient to induce any agent of crowding type
c to switch to a jurisdiction with pro¯le pro(G) o®ering y. Therefore, for
all " > 0, all agents are strictly worse o® if they join a jurisdiction o®ering
(y;Cpro(G)) at the price ¡1
" then they are at the core state.
Suppose instead that case (b) obtains. By the argument above, any
agents who happen to be in the set Hc(y;pro(G)) are worse o® in the new
jurisdiction with the admission price Ãc(y;pro(G)) then they are in their core
jurisdictions. By construction, all agents in Ic(y;pro(G)) are no better o®
34if they choose the G, o®ering public projects y, with the admission price
Ãc(y;pro(G)).
It only remains to show that there exists " > 0 such that for any z
satisfying (z;y) 2 P(Cpro(G)); pro¯ts are nonpositive. First note that if for
even one c 2 C appearing in G, case (a) holds, we can choose " arbitrarily
close to zero, which makes the admission price for type c an arbitrarily large
negative number. Obviously then, for small enough ",
X
Cpro(G)c6=0
ncÃc(y;Cpro(G)) · p ¢ z for any z such that (z;y) 2 P(Cpro(G)):
Next suppose that case (b) holds for every crowding type represented in G
(note this exhausts all possibilities). We proceed by contradiction. Suppose,
X
Cpro(G)c6=0
ncÃc(y;Cpro(G)) > p ¢ z for some z such that (z;y) 2 P(Cpro(G));
that is, pro¯ts are positive. Then
X
Cpro(G)c6=0
MaxWTPc(y;pro(G)) > p¢z for some z such that (z;y) 2 P(Cpro(G)):
In this case, (i) there is enough revenue to cover the costs of producing y.
Since Ic(y;pro(G)) is nonempty, then there exist agents who are exactly as
well o® when they join this jurisdiction at the posted prices. Thus, given
these prices, the members of the jurisdiction G could (collectively) a®ord
and prefer the jurisdiction G o®ering the project y. This is a contradiction
to the separation argument.
Thus, the admission prices constructed above satisfy both the properties
that no agent, given these prices, would strictly prefer jurisdiction and public
projects bundle to his core allocation, and pro¯ts in all jurisdictions are
nonpositive.
Step 4. (¼;X;Y;Z;U);p and Ã satisfy the requirements for a competitive
equilibrium.
First, from the above de¯nition of Ãc(y;pro(G)) it is immediate that
in the core state the budget constraint of each agent is satis¯ed. From the
construction of admission prices, it follows that no agent i can a®ord a bundle
35preferred to (X(i);Y (i);pro(¼i)) for if he could, then, from monotonicity,
there would be an a®ordable bundle of private goods for the jurisdiction ¼i
that would enable all members of ¼i to be better o® than they are in the
initially given core state of the economy (¼;X;Y;Z;U). This contradicts the
separating hyperplane property of the price system p.
We have already shown zero pro¯ts for those jurisdictions in ¼ (condition
3.) To prove the impossibility of positive pro¯ts (condition 4.), suppose that
for some jurisdiction G 2 F and some (z;y) 2 P(pro(G)), it holds that
X
i2G
Ã·(i)(y;pro(G)) ¡ p ¢ z > 0:




0(i) ¡ p ¢ x
i) ¡ p ¢ z > 0
where, for each i 2 G it holds that u¿(i)(xi;y;G) = u¿(i)(X(i);Y (i);¼i):
However, the above expression implies that there are bundles of private goods
for each consumer, say ±i 2RL
+ for consumer i; so that
P
i2G(p ¢ !0(i) ¡ p ¢
xi ¡ p ¢ ±i) ¡ p ¢ z = 0. This contradicts the separating hyperplane property
of the price system p.
A Appendix B
Proposition. Let (»;¼) be an admissible coalition-jurisdiction structure,
then ¼ is a jurisdiction structure.
Proof of Proposition
First, we state the following result for an arbitrary partition.
Claim: Let ¼ denote a partition of N and let Ap = \S2¼;jSj=pS be the
set of all jurisdictions in ¼ containing p members. Then, ¼ is a jurisdiction
structure of N if and only if for every p, the restriction of ¼ to Ap, denoted
by ¼p is a jurisdiction structure.
Proof of claim: Let n be an index set for ¼ and for every integer p let np
be the restriction of n to ¼p. It is obvious that n = [np. Since the measure





36Suppose that for some p0, ¼p0 is not a jurisdiction structure. Then, there
exists two index sets np0 and n0




Let us consider two index sets n and n0 for ¼ such that the restriction of
n to ¼p0 is np0, the restriction of n0 to ¼p0 is n0
p0 and outside ¼p0, n and n0
coincide. Therefore, from the ¾ additivity of the measure it follows that
¹(n) 6= ¹(n
0):
Thus, ¼ is not jurisdiction structure. Now, suppose that for every p, ¼p is





From the ¾ additivity of the measure it follows that
¹(n) = ¹(n
0):
Therefore, ¼ is a jurisdiction structure, this concludes the proof of the claim.
Now, suppose that (»;¼) is an admissible coalition-jurisdiction structure
and let us prove that for every p, ¼p is a jurisdiction
structure. First, for every integer k let
»
k = fW 2 » j jW \ ¼pj = kg:
It is clear that ¼p = [k¸p»k \ ¼p. Therefore, if ¼p is not a jurisdiction
structure, following the same reasoning as in the above claim, one can deduce
that for some k0, »k0\¼p is not a jurisdiction structure. Therefore there exists
two index sets nk0;p and n0




It is easy to construct two index sets nk0 and n0











This contradicts the fact that (»;¼) is an admissible coalition-jurisdiction
structure.¥
37Proposition. Assume (A.1)-(A.2) (A.4), then (A.6) [SSGE] implies (A.7)
[PCB].
Proof of Proposition
The proof is similar to the one in Kaneko and Wooders (1986, Lemma 3.3).
Suppose the negation. Then, there exists an increasing sequence fKºg such
that for some ± 2 [0;1] for some c0;t0 one could choose sequences of subsets
fSºg of agents and feasible states of the economy f(¼º;Xº;Y º;Zº;Uº)g with
the equal treatment property, where, for each º, (¼º;Xº;Y º;Zº;Uº) is rela-






jSºj ¸ (1 ¡ ±)
¹(Nct)
¹(N) for all (c;t) 2 C £ T
) ut0(Xº(i);Y º(i);pro(¼º
i )) > Kº for all i 2 Sc0t0:
(2)
From assumptions (A.4) { boundedness of inputs implies boundedness of
public project outputs, and (A.6), SSGE, we can ¯nd an º0 such that for all
agents i of type (c0;t0) in Sº and for some private good, say the `th; it holds
that
Uº(i) = ut0(Xº0(i);Y º0(i);pro(¼
º0
i )) > Kº0
) Xº0(i)` + Zº(i)` >
¹(N)
(1¡±)¢¹(Nc0t0)§c;t!0(ct)`;
to have much utility, one must have much of at least one private good to
consume and/or to use in production of public goods. Since consumptions
of private goods and inputs of private goods into the production of public









¸ jSºj§c;t!0(ct)` (since, from 2,
jSº
ctj










This contradicts the feasibility of the allocation.
Theorem 1. Nonemptiness of the core. Under
assumptions (A.1)-(A.2), (A.4), and (A.6), the equal-treatment core of
the game generated by the economy is nonempty.21 Furthermore, there is at
least one outcome in the core with the equal treatment property.
21The anonymity assumptions (A.3) and (A.5) are not required for this result.
38Proof of Theorem 1. The proof of this Theorem follows by showing
that the conditions required for Kaneko and Wooders (1986,Theorem 1),
demonstrating the nonemptiness of the f-core of a continuum game, are
satis¯ed by the game induced by the economy. First, we will review the
model and statement of Theorem 1 of Kaneko and Wooders (1986).
Given the measure space of players N, a characteristic function game
V without side payments is a correspondence on F which assigns to each
coalition S 2 F a subset V (S) with the following properties:
1. V (S) is a nonempty closed subset of RS for all S 2 F;
2. V (S) £ V (W) ½ V (S [ W) for any S;W 2 F with S \ W = ;;
3. infi2N supV (fig) > ¡1;
4. for any S 2 F; V (S)= [ [interiorV (fig) £ RS¡fig] is nonempty and
bounded.
A characteristic function game can be generated by an economy in the
usual way. Speci¯cally, given a ¯nite coalition S, de¯ne
V (S) = fu 2 RS : for some feasible state of the economy for S, say (¼;X;Y;Z;U);
it holds that for each i 2 S; u¿(i)(X(i);Y (i);Cpro(¼i)) ¸ uig:
Condition 1 is satis¯ed for the game derived from the economy from close-
ness of the consumption sets Xct;(A.1), continuity of utility functions, and
closeness of the production possibility sets. Condition 2. is immediate since
one possibility open to a coalition (or a jurisdiction) consisting of S [ W ,
(S \ W = ;) is to form a partition into disjoint coalitions S and W. Condi-
tion 3. is also immediate since there are only a ¯nite number of types and
since the supremum of a ¯nite set of real numbers is a real number. Con-
dition 4 is simply that the set of feasible and individually rational payo®s
is bounded above. This follows from the assumptions that a ¯nite amount
of private goods can produce only a bounded amount of public and private
goods (A.4). Kaneko and Wooders also require that collection of ¯nite games
satis¯es per capita boundedness, which we have imposed directly.
The nonemptiness theorem stated in Kaneko and Wooders (1986) does
not mention the equal-treatment property. Their result is proven, however,
by showing existence of an equal-treatment f-core payo® that is the limit of
39equal-treatment payo®s in ¯nite approximating games. We will brie°y sketch
the result.
Wooders (1983) shows that sequences of games with types satisfying per
capita boundedness have nonempty approximate cores. This result is based
on the result that, in large games, when all \improvement" can be carried out
by coalitions bounded in size and the bound is small relative to the economy,
provided payo® sets do not contain segments parallel to the axes { called
strong comprehensiveness or nonlevelness{ then all payo®s in the core of a
(¯nite) game have the equal treatment property. Moreover, even without
strong comprehensiveness, under these conditions the core, when nonempty,
contains an equal-treatment payo®. Building on these results, Shubik and
Wooders (1983) establish that for any sequence of games satisfying per capita
boundedness, eventually there are equal treatment payo®s in approximate
cores. Kaneko and Wooders (1986) use this result to show that there is a
sequence of vectors fuºg; where u 2RCT (taking CT as the number of types
of players) represents an equal treatment payo® in the core of a ¯nite game
with proportions of players in the ¯nite games converging to the proportions
in the continuum limit game. From per capita boundedness, the sequence
fuºg has a converging subsequence, converging to, say u¤. The function h
: N !R de¯ned by h(i) = u¤
ct when i is of type (c;t) is in the core of a
continuum limit game.
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